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KANT ON THE UNITY OF THEORETICAL
AND PRACTICAL REASON
PAULINE KLEINGELD
!VANT FAMOUSLY ASSERTS THAT REASON is ONE AND THE SAME, whether
it is applied theoretically, to the realm of what is, or practically, to the
realm of what ought to be. His view that theoretical and practical rea-
son are two different applications of "one and the same reason"1 is
known as the doctrine of the unity of reason. Yet Kant himself seems
to contradict this doctrine in two ways. In some passages in the very
same works in which he asserts the unity of reason, he also states that
this unity has yet to be demonstrated. According to the Foundations
of the Metaphysics of Morals, demonstrating the unity of practical and
theoretical reason is one of the tasks of a critique of practical reason.2
In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant further postpones this task
by saying that we can expect this unity only to be demonstrated "some
day."3 Moreover, Kant also claims that theoretical and practical rea-
son are "united" through the idea of the purposiveness of nature, sug-
gesting an original disunity.4 Thus, it seems that Kant defends three
Correspondence to: Department of Philosophy, Washington University,
Campus Box 1073, One Brookings Dr., Saint Louis, MO 63130-4899.
1 Critique of Practical Reason (hereafter "CPrR"), 5:121; see Founda-
tions of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:391. All references to Kant are to the
standard volume number and pagination of Kants Gesammelte Schriften.
Ausgabe der königlich preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin:
Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1900-). Translations are my own.
2 Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:391. Kant here speaks of
"speculative" reason. For purposes of terminological clarity, I shall use the
term "theoretical reason" throughout, although Kant uses both the terms the-
oretical reason and speculative reason (see for example, CPrR, 5:5, 50, 54-5,
89, and 119-121). He sometimes labels the use of speculative reason as a sub-
set of the use of theoretical reason, but this distinction is not important for
the purposes of this paper. See for example, Critique of Pure Reason (here-
after "CPR"), A805/B833 (references to the Critique of Pure Reason are to
the pages of the first [A] and second [B] editions); with regard to theoretical
versus speculative cognition, A633-5/B661-3.
3 CPrR, 5:91.
4 For example, CPU, A815-6/B843-4.
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incompatible claims regarding the unity of reason. It would seem that
he cannot consistently hold at the same time that (1) theoretical and
practical reason are one and the same reason, applied differently, (2)
that he still needs to show that they axe, and (3) that they are united.
The assessments in the literature are as divergent as Kant's state-
ments. Some authors have argued that Kant does not give a coherent
account of the unity of theoretical and practical reason at all. In his
article, "The Unity of Reason: Pure Reason as Practical Reason in
Kant's Early Conception of the Transcendental Dialectic," Paul Guyer
argues that early in the critical period, Kant wisely realized that the
notion of a unity of reason can refer only to completed systematicity
in the sphere of practice, thereafter gradually giving up the idea of a
unity of theoretical and practical reason, and finally reassigning theo-
retical reason's regulative ideal of systematicity to reflective judg-
ment.5 Others, most recently Jurg Freudiger, have argued that Kant
does present a coherent account of the unity of theoretical and practi-
cal reason, but not until the Critique of Judgment* This view that
Kant does not present an account of the unity of reason until the third
critique is often based on a stylized view of the three critiques, ac-
cording to which the first critique establishes the a priori laws of na-
ture, the second critique the a priori law of freedom, and the third cri-
tique the harmony between the laws of nature and freedom. In this
vein, Henry Allison argues that before the Critique of Judgment, Kant
defends "a rigid separation between the realms of freedom and na-
5 Paul Guyer, "The Unity of Reason: Pure Reason as Practical Reason in
Kant's Early Conception of the Transcendental Dialectic," The Monist 72
(1989): 139-67. Guyer nonetheless speaks of Kant's doctrine of "the unity of
reason," but not as the unity of theoretical and practical reason. Rather, he
uses the phrase to refer to reason's "single domain of application" and its in-
troduction of "a single special sort of unity into whatever it is to which it is
appropriately applied" (139). This interpretation of the phrase also lies be-
hind Guyer's recent claim that Kant states "his theory of the unity of reason
as the culmination of a theory of reflective judgment" Paul Guyer, review of
The Unity of Reason, by Susan Neiman, Philosophical Review 106 (1997):
292 6 Most recently, see, Jurg Freudiger, "Kants Schlufistein: Wie die
Teleologie die Einheit der Vernunft stiftet," Kant-Studien 87 (1996): 423-35.
Eckart Förster has argued that the third critique contains Kant's attempt to
show the "unifiability of theoretical and practical reason," in "Was darf ich
hoffen? Zum Problem der Vereinbarkeit von theoretischer und praktischer
Vernunft bei Immanuel Kant," Zeitschrift für phüosophische Forschung 46
(1992): 1.70.
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tare," whereas in the third critique, he "now insists on the necessity of
a mediating concept (the purposiveness of nature), which would make
possible the transition from the concept of nature to the concept of
freedom."7 Despite their differences, these assessments share one as-
sumption, namely, that before the Critique of Judgment (1790), Kant
does not adequately address the relationship between theoretical and
practical reason.
Other commentators, by contrast, argue that Kant does present a
coherent account of the unity of reason in his critical work of the
1780's. Susan Neiman and Klaus Konhardt maintain that Kant devel-
ops this account in the first two critiques. On their view, the unity of
theoretical and practical reason consists in the fact that they share
structural and functional features.8 Konhardt also argues that because
Kant's account of the unity of reason was in essence ready as early as
the Critique of Pure Reason, the Critique of Judgment brings "no es-
sential modifications" in this account at all.9
In this paper, I propose a new reading of Kant's doctrine of the
unity of reason. I argue that this doctrine should be viewed as reach-
ing a coherent form in the 1780's, but for reasons other than those as-
serted by Neiman and Konhardt. I start by showing why their ac-
counts fail to establish the unity of reason. I then discuss the tensions
between Kant's three seemingly contradictory statements on the is-
sue, mentioned at the beginning of this essay, and I propose a solution
as to how to interpret them as compatible. In section 2,1 argue that
the first and the second statements are compatible if the first is inter-
preted as a regulative principle, and I argue that there are compelling
reasons for interpreting it as such. In sections 3-7, I argue that the
first two statements are compatible with the third, by showing that
they bear on very different issues. In the final section, I argue that this
interpretation necessitates a radical re-evaluation of the relationship
7 See Henry Allison, "The Gulf between Nature and Freedom and Na-
ture's Guarantee of Perpetual Peace." in Proceedings of the Eighth Interna-
tional Kant Congress, ed. Hoke Robinson (Milwaukee: Marquette University
Press, 1995), 37-8.
"Susan Neiman, The Unity of Reason: Rereading Kant (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1994); Klaus Konhardt, Die Einheit der Vernunft: Zum
Verhdltnis von theoretischer und praktischer Vernunft in der Philosophie
Immanuel Rants (Königstein: Forum Academicum, 1979).
9 Konhardt, Die Einheit der Vernunft, 10.
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between Kant's 1780's doctrine of the unity of reason and his position
in the third critique.
The Faüure of the Argument from Similarity. Neiman and Kon-
hardt argue for the unity of reason by providing an analysis of the
functions Kant ascribes to theoretical and practical reason, and by
stressing the many similarities between them. Without actually argu-
ing for this explicitly, they assume that these similarities prove that
theoretical and practical reason are one and the same reason, applied
differently.10
Such similarities certainly exist. The two that are most important
for the purposes of this paper are the following. First, both theoreti-
cal and practical reason strive for systematization. Kant defines the
systematization of something as "[exhibiting] the interconnection of
its parts in conformity with a single principle."11 Theoretical reason
strives for the systematic unity of knowledge and practical reason for
the systematic unity of our maxims for action. Kant assumes that a
systematic order can be achieved only when one employs an anteced-
ent idea of such order.12 That in turn means that this unifying idea
cannot be derived from nature or from our maxims but has to be pro-
vided by reason itself.13
Accordingly, a second characteristic that theoretical and practi-
cal reason share is the use of 'ideas.' For its systematizing activity,
theoretical reason employs the ideas of the soul, the world, and God
as regulative principles.14 Practical reason uses the very same three
ideas as postulates.16 Moreover, in its systematizing efforts, practical
reason constructs the idea of an intelligible moral world (a realm of
ends) as a systematic whole, in which there is harmony between our
10 Neiman, The Unity of Reason, most clearly, p. 128; Konhardt, Die
Einheit der Vemunft, 11.
11CPR, A645/B673.
12CPR, A645/B673.
13 See Konhardt, Die Einheit der Vemunft, ch. 1.
» For example, CPR, A682-6/B710-4. I leave aside the regulative ideas
mentioned in the first part of the appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic,
which are based on the idea of a supreme intelligence; CPR, A642-68/B67U-
96.
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own moral maxims and those of others.16 Finally, Kant argues that
both from a theoretical and from a moral perspective, we have
grounds to assume (subjectively) that nature is a purposive order.17
It is worth noting that the fact that theoretical and practical rea-
son share the use of ideas does not imply that the epistemic status of
these ideas is the same in both cases. Theoretical reason is entitled to
use these ideas only as regulative principles to guide empirical investi-
gations. From a moral point of view, by contrast, the ideas can be
given the stronger epistemic status of practical postulates. I return to
Kant's description of the two uses of reason, and the primacy of prac-
tical reason, in sections 3-7.
Neiman and Konhardt are right to point out that there are similar-
ities between theoretical and practical reason, but it does not follow
from this fact that they are different uses of "one and the same rea-
son."18 Showing that they perform similar activities or use similar
ideas does not suffice to show that they are the same entity employed
differently. There could very well be two separate but similar facul-
ties, each operating in its own sphere. Theoretical and practical rea-
son could be two similar kinds of reason, or two reasons, instead of
being two modes of application of a single faculty. In order to prove
that there is only a single faculty at work, more argument is needed
than Konhardt and Neman provide.
The problem at issue here is not that of the identity of theoretical
and practical reason. Kant's claim is not that they are indistinguish-
able. As different uses of one and the same reason they are nonidenti-
cal. Rather, the question is whether or not there is one faculty (rea-
son) that is employed in two different ways (theoretically and
16 Kant is fond of pointing out that theoretical and practical reason em-
ploy the same three ideas (the ideas of the soul, of the world or freedom, and
of God): see CPB, A329/B386; CPrfl, 5:3-12, and 134-8. There are notorious
problems with this claim of Kant's as well as with the (unstable) roles he as-
signs to the three ideas, but since these problems are not directly relevant to
the present topic, I leave them aside here.
16 For example, CPR, A808/B836; Foundations of the Metaphysics of
Morals, 4:433.
"Neiman fails to recognize the importance of the concept of purposive-
ness, but Konhardt brings it out well. See, Konhardt, Die Einheit der Ver-
nunft, 150-82.18 In his review of Neiman's book, Paul Guyer has recently made an anal-
ogous criticism regarding Neiman's discussion of the relationship between
the realms of nature and freedom. See above, note 5.
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practically). The argument from similarity does not suffice to answer
this question.
In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant himself is keenly aware
that he has not yet demonstrated the unity of theoretical and practical
reason. The structural analogies between the first two critiques
"rightfully give rise to the expectation" that "we may perhaps gain in-
sight into the unity of the entire pure rational faculty (both theoretical
and practical) and be able to derive everything from one principle."19
In other words, in order to demonstrate the unity of the two Kant
would have to move to a higher level of analysis.20 He would have to
discuss reason as such, and subsequently explain its dual application
in terms of this general analysis. Nowhere, however, does Kant pro-
vide such an explicit analysis and discussion of reason. Instead, he al-
ways discusses it in one of its two employments, as either theoretical
or practical reason.
Yet one might perhaps think that Kant's claim that reason is the
faculty of principles21 could be read as such a general statement about
reason. Kant makes this claim in the context of his discussion of the-
oretical reason in the first critique, and in investigating its a priori
ideas he explicitly "puts practical reason aside."22 At least one com-
mentator has taken the claim to also express his implicit doctrine of
reason as such. Lewis White Beck, after noting the contradiction be-
tween Kant's assertion of the unity of reason and his admission that
he has not shown it yet, cheerfully brushes the interpretative quanda-
ries raised here aside, saying "it is fortunately not difficult" to state
the "one principle" warranting the unity of reason.23 On Beck's view,
19 CPR, 5:91, emphasis mine.
20 It might be suggested that when Kant says that theoretical and practi-
cal reason are two uses of one and the same faculty, he is merely claiming to
know that this is so, whereas the admission that he must still achieve insight
into this unity refers to further insight into the justification of the first claim.
This attempt at reconciling the two statements, however, faces the problem
that Kant cannot consistently claim the status of knowledge for the first
claim as long as he cannot justify it.
21 Critique of Pure Reason, A299/B356; see also Critique of Judgment
(hereafter "G7"), 5:401.
22 Critique of Pure Reason, A329/B386.
23 Lewis White Beck, A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical
Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), 47. Allison notes the
contradiction, too, but he does not discuss it: Henry E. Allison, Kant's The-
ory of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 245, 284 n.
28.
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this is the idea that reason is the faculty of principles. Kant himself
may not always have been clear about this, and in the first critique he
applies the statement only to theoretical reason because he has not
yet fully developed his second critique view of moral autonomy. Yet
given Kant's later view that practical reason provides universal moral
principles, Beck argues, we can easily broaden the application of the
statement and take it as a statement about reason as such, whether in
its theoretical or its practical mode.
Appealing though it may be, this strategy leaves two important
questions unanswered. First, it fails to explain why Kant would so se-
verely understate his own achievements. If it is so easy to show the
unity of reason, and if the first and second critiques provide the build-
ing blocks for doing so, why does Kant claim in the second critique
that he can only hope to do so in the future? Beck provides no expla-
nation for this.
Second, Beck does not address the issue of what justifies Kant's
statement that "it is only one and the same reason which judges a pri-
ori by principles, whether for theoretical or for practical purposes."24
A full account of the unity of reason should also show what grounds
Kant has for believing there is only one reason, especially in light of
both his explicit denial that he has proven this and his explicit brack-
eting of practical reason in the investigation of the transcendental
ideas. The fact that, in both of its modes, reason provides us with a
priori principles does not provide the necessary grounds. Instead, it
merely constitutes a similarity between theoretical and practical rea-
son, and as I showed above, the argument from similarity is insuffi-
cient to show the unity of reason.
n
In Defense of a Regulative Reading. These problems can be
solved if we take Kant's statement that theoretical and practical rea-
son are uses of one and the same reason as a regulative claim. A regu-
lative reading of the statement also makes it possible to reconstruct




shown it. This will make it possible to reconcile the first two of the
three statements mentioned at the beginning of this paper.
hi justifying the use of regulative ideas of the soul, the world, and
God, Kant generally appeals to theoretical reason's interest in system-
atic unity. His basic view is that although it is impossible to prove or
disprove objectively the existence of things that correspond to the
transcendental ideas, we are nevertheless justified in using these
ideas as regulative principles, since their use is necessary to guide
reason's effort to establish a systematic unity of knowledge.25 A sys-
tematic unity of knowledge can be achieved only when one employs
an antecedent idea of such order. Thus, for example, Kant defends
the use of the regulative idea of God by saying that "its speculative in-
terest, and not its insight, gives reason the right" to use this idea.26
Now if striving for systematic unity is one of the hallmarks of rea-
son then it would be only natural if this striving were also extended
to reason itself. Kant does indeed call "insight into the unity of the en-
tire pure rational faculty (both theoretical and practical)" an "un-
avoidable need of human reason, as it finds complete satisfaction only
in a perfectly systematic unity of its cognitions."27 Then reason's in-
terest in its own unity would seem to justify the use of the regulative
idea necessary for that purpose.
This regulative idea is that of the soul. The use of this idea in-
volves, among other things, that we "represent... all [mental] powers,
so far as possible, as derived from a single fundamental power."28 Be-
cause the idea of the soul includes the notion of the unity of all mental
powers, and because theoretical and practical reason are mental pow-
ers, use' of the idea of the soul involves representing them as two man-
ifestations of a single power, instead of as two independent entities.
Kant says in the Critique of Pure Reason:
26 See CPR A676/B704, and A686-7/B714-5. On the use of regulative
ideas see Thomas E. Wartenberg, "Reason and the Practice of Science, in
The Cambridge Companion to Kant, ed. Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1992), 228-48. B
26 CPR A676/B704 See also Kant's discussion of reason s ngnt or
need" to "presuppose and assume as a subjective ground something thai she
is not allowed to claim to know through objective grounds," in "What is On-
entation in Thinking?," 8:137.
"CPrR, 5:91.
28 CPR, A683/B711.
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At first glance the various appearances of one and the same substance
show so much dissimilarity that initially one cannot but assume almost
as many powers as there appear effects, as in the human mind there are
sensation, consciousness, imagination,.. . and so forth. Initially a logi-
cal maxim requires that we reduce this seeming variety as far as possi-
ble by detecting hidden identity through comparison Although logic
does not at all determine whether such a power actually exists, the idea
of a fundamental power is at least the problem of a systematic repre-
sentation of the diversity of powers. The logical principle of reason de-
mands that this unity be brought about as far as possible. . . . But this
unity of reason29 is merely hypothetical. One asserts not that it must ac-
tually be found, but rather that one must seek it in the interest of reason,
in order to set up certain principles for the many rules that experience
may supply us with, and thereby to bring systematic unity into cognition
whenever this is possible.30
The heuristic assumption of the unity of mental powers also applies to
theoretical and practical reason. Hence, Kant's claim that they are dif-
ferent modes of application of one and the same reason should be re-
garded as an expression of this more general regulative idea of a fun-
damental power.31 Given that the problem of the unity of reason is
itself a theoretical, not a moral problem, the unity of reason is a regu-
lative idea, not a practical postulate.
This interpretation makes it possible to reconcile Kant's claim
that theoretical and practical reason are one and the same reason, ap-
plied differently, with his statement that he has not yet shown that this
is so. If the first claim is read as an expression of a regulative assump-
tion, instead of as a claim to knowledge, it is compatible with the lack
of theoretical insight expressed in the second statement.
At this point, however, the regulative reading of the unity of rea-
son raises a new objection. Recall that Kant expresses hopes of dem-
onstrating that reason is one and the same in its two employments.
Yet if the unity of reason has the status of a regulative idea, in particu-
lar, if it is to be subsumed under the regulative idea of the soul, this
29 "Vernunfteinheit" here refers to the unity established by reason.
MCPR, A648-9/B676-7.
31 In his analysis of the unity of the subject's cognitive powers, Dieter
Henrich has argued that this unity has the status of a subjective principle.
The reading of the unity of reason I present in this essay is compatible with
Henrich's analysis, although he argues for it differently and discusses all cog-
nitive powers, not merely reason. See "On the Unity of Subjectivity," trans.
Gunter Zöller, in Dieter Henrich, The Unity of Reason: Essays on Kant's Phi-




might seem to doom his hopes from the start. For he also claims that
the idea of the soul transcends the limits of possible experience.32
That would seem to make the regulative reading of Kant's statement
about the unity of reason incompatible with his declaration that we
may one day gain insight into this unity.
This objection can be easily answered, though. Although com-
plete conformity to the regulative idea of the soul will never be found,
one cannot know a priori to what extent things will turn out to con-
form to it.33 Therefore, one should not set a limit a priori to what in-
sights might be gained, except where one can demonstrate that such
insight is impossible. Although the unity of reason cannot be ascer-
tained by empirical means, as reason itself is not a possible object of
experience, Kant leaves open the possibility that its unity may be dis-
covered by philosophical means. Moreover, establishing the unity of
reason would not exhaust the scope of the regulative idea of the soul,
because its scope is much broader. Accordingly, in his discussion of
the idea of a fundamental mental power, Kant suggests that it is im-
possible ever to discover whether there is an "absolutely" fundamen-
tal power, but that one may be able to find "comparatively" fundamen-
tal powers.34 Demonstrating that there is only one reason, then,
requires identifying a comparatively fundamental power, not the abso-
lutely fundamental power.
So far I have argued that Kant has grounds to defend the unity of
reason as a regulative principle. This does not yet suffice, however, to
defend the regulative reading of the particular passage in the text in
which Kant asserts reason's unity.36 If the context clearly indicated
that Kant presents the statement as a claim to knowledge, this would
invalidate a regulative reading. Thus, it needs to be shown that the
context of the statement allows or even invites a regulative reading.
To this end, I here add two supporting considerations that pertain to
the passage in question.
32 For example, CPR, A682-3/B710-1.
33 This point is also made, in a. different context, by Paul Guyer, "The
Systematic Order of Nature and the Systematic Union of Ends," in Vernunft-
begriffe in der Moderne: Stuttgarter Hegel-Kongrefi 1993, ed. Hans
Friedrich Fulda and Rolf-Peter Horstmann (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1994), 206.
34CPR,A649/B677.
«CPrR, 5:121.
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The first point to note is that while Kant does not indicate in the
text that the statement should be read as regulative, this is no argu-
ment against reading it in such a way. Other regulative principles, for
example, the teleological maxim that "everything in nature originates
from the wise intentions of an intelligent author of the world,"36 are
not formulated explicitly as regulative principles either. The regula-
tive epistemic status of such principles becomes clear only in the dis-
cussion of their justification.
Second, in the same sentence in which Kant claims that theoreti-
cal and practical reason "are" uses of one and the same reason, he also
states that our consciousness of the moral law "shows" that pure rea-
son can be practical. It is clear from the context, however, that this
showing does not lead to theoretical knowledge of pure reason's being
practical, but rather, to a subjective practical certainty which is not
(and cannot be) objectively secured. In other words, the very same
passage in which Kant claims that theoretical and practical reason are
different uses of one and the same reason contains another assertion
that looks like a claim to theoretical knowledge but must be inter-
preted as having a weaker status when read in context. In this situa-
tion it is natural to use a similar interpretive strategy for the statement
about the unity of reason. This resolves the tension between Kant's
claim that theoretical and practical reason are different applications
of one and the same faculty (now understood as a regulative state-
ment) and his claim that he has not shown this yet (in the sense of not
having proven it).
It lies beyond the scope of this article to pursue the many meth-
odological questions that are raised by Kant's assertion that reason's
interest in unity is also directed towards itself, questions that go to the
heart of his transcendental philosophical project as a critique of rea-
son by reason.37 I here limit myself to his account of reason's unity.
Therefore, after having shown that Kant's first two claims about the
unity of reason are compatible, I now move to the third claim, that the-
oretical and practical reason are united.
36 See CPU, A687-8/B715-6.
371 discuss some of these issues, as well as Kant's quasi-hypostatizing
descriptions of reason, in "The Conaove Character of Reason in Kant's Phi-
losophy," Journal of the History of Philosophy 36 (1998): 77-97.
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Theoretical and Practical Reason as United. We can now ask
how there could be a need to unite theoretical and practical reason. If
Kant assumes—as a regulative principle—that they are one and the
same reason, used differently, what could it possibly mean to say that
they are united? The very notion of unification presupposes an ante-
cedent disunity, which seems to go against Kant's doctrine of the
unity of reason.
-p^e answer to this question can be found by pursuing some of the
questions that arise from Kant's account so far. If, in Une with the re-
sults of the previous section, one assumes (regulatively) that theoreti-
cal and practical reason are two different uses of one and the same
reason, it is still possible that these uses are in conflict. If there is a
radical division of labor between them, as Kant suggests, the question
arises as to whether their activities are compatible. Should they be in
conflict, this would threaten the very possibility of representing rea-
son—and thus our mental powers in general—as a systematic unity.
Kant indeed mentions the possibility of a "conflict of reason with
itself," a conflict which would arise if theoretical and practical reason
"were arranged merely side by side."38 Under such circumstances, he
suggests, a scenario could emerge in which theoretical reason would
"close its borders and admit into its domain nothing from [practical
reason], while the latter would extend its boundaries over everything
and, when its needs required, would seek to comprehend the former
within them."39 What Kant seems to be saying in this difficult passage
is that it is conceptually possible that reason in its theoretical use,
which strives for systematic knowledge of what is, would reject the
normative moral claims of reason in its practical use, and thus would
reject the postulates that Kant says are connected with morality. Af-
ter all, theoretical reason has nothing to do with claims about what
ought to be or with postulates that are based entirely on such claims.
Practical reason, on the other hand, which determines how we ought
to act, would not let itself be constrained by questions of what can or
cannot be known. It would disregard the limits of knowledge and
pass off postulates as facts.
38 CPrR, 5:121.
39 CPrR, 5:121.
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Given that Kant attributes to reason an interest in its own system-
atic unity, though, he can be expected to argue that the two modes of
reason can be reconciled. Indeed, Kant argues that theoretical and
practical reason not only do not contradict each other but even con-
verge on important propositions. In the Critique of Pure Reason, he
calls this the "unification" of theoretical and practical reason, in the
Critique of Practical Reason their "combination in one cognition."40
Here I shall first indicate briefly the main steps in Kant's argument. In
the next sections, I fill in some of the details.
To support his claim that the uses of theoretical and practical rea-
son are in harmony, Kant points out that both lead to the assumption
that nature is ordered and owes its rational order to a highest intelli-
gence. In the Critique of Pure Reason, he first discusses the impor-
tance of this assumption for theoretical reason (in the Transcendental
Dialectic). He later argues that morality, too, leads to this assump-
tion,41 and that this makes it possible to regard nature and morality as
being in harmony. In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant argues
similarly that we must assume that a moral author of the world has
brought about a purposive harmony between nature and morality—a
belief which is also "in unison with the theoretical need of reason."42
When seen in this context, it becomes clear that Kant's talk of
uniting theoretical and practical reason refers to the harmony of the
two uses of reason, and not to the singleness of the one faculty whose
uses they are. This makes it possible to see that there is no conflict
between Kant's statements regarding the unity and the unification of
reason. The problem of the unity of reason discussed in the previous
two sections was the problem of whether theoretical and practical
reason could be said to be two modes of employment of one and the
same reason. The problem of the unification of theoretical and practi-
cal reason, on the other hand, is the problem of whether these two
uses are in harmony with each other.
This reading of Kant's claim regarding the unification of theoreti-
cal and practical reason calls for more clarification, though, especially
as to the role of the assumption that nature is ordered by a highest in-
40 CPrR, 5:121. The term "cognition" (Erkenntnis) should not be read in
the sense of an empirical cognition, of course, but in the sense of a concep-




telligence. I shall argue that the view of nature as designed is not
merely a view on which theoretical and practical reason concur (since
that is also true of the three transcendental ideas), but that it connects
the two uses of reason. The nature of this connection is the subject of
the next three sections. We shall see that the problem Kant addresses
here is in essence the problem that he formulates in the Critique of
Judgment as the well-known problem of the "immense gulf1 between
the realms of nature and freedom, a problem that many commenta-
tors (erroneously, in my view) believe Kant does not pose until the
third critique.
In section 4,1 examine the role of theoretical reason. This exam-
ination serves a preparatory role by providing some necessary ele-
ments for clarifying the nature of the unification of the two uses of
reason in section 5.
rv
Theoretical Reason. This section contributes to solving the prob-
lem of the unification of theoretical and practical reason only indi-
rectly, and its contribution will become fully clear in the discussion of
practical reason. To anticipate, however, the point is this. Kant
claims that practical reason provides grounds for regarding nature as
being in harmony with its demands. Before this claim can be taken as
unifying theoretical and practical reason—as Kant claims it should
be it needs to be shown that practical reason's assumption of such
harmony does not conflict with theoretical reason's essential endeav-
ors. Because much of the most influential literature on the Critique
of Pure Reason does not deal with the Transcendental Dialectic or the
Doctrine of Method in much detail (typically focussing on the Tran-
scendental Aesthetic and Analytic instead), it is necessary to provide
some background on the role of theoretical reason.
In Kant's account of the function of theoretical reason in the Cri-
tique of Pure Reason, the concept of systematicity plays a central
role. Kant distinguishes between two kinds of systematic unity of na-
ture. The first consists in the formal coherence and hierarchical order
of a multitude of empirical laws, which is what he later will call "for-
mal purposiveness" in the Critique of Judgment. The second consists
in a teleological order of nature. I shall discuss each in turn.
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Theoretical reason strives to bring about a systematic unity of ex-
perience, thereby combining the material given by the understanding
to a higher unity.43 The Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of
Pure Reason shows that all experience conforms to a set of system-
atic principles a priori and that it is experience of a single nature.44
These results, however, do not yet explain the possibility of forming a
systematic whole of empirical knowledge. For example, the synthetic
a priori principle that every event has a cause does not by itself imply
that our finite cognitive powers can grasp particular causes and
events and subsume them successfully under identifiable empirical
laws, let alone that we can organize these laws into a systematically
unified body of knowledge. Kant has not yet established the condi-
tions of the possibility of transforming an aggregate of empirical
cognitions into a systematic body of empirical knowledge.
Kant formulates this problem in the Transcendental Dialectic, es-
pecially in the Appendix. There he argues that our very search for a
systematic unity of knowledge presupposes that nature will enable
such unity, that is, that nature is systematizable for our cognitive pow-
ers. For instance, it presupposes that the things in nature can be orga-
nized in terms of genera and species, and that it is possible to discover
and organize empirical laws. In other words, it presupposes that sys-
tematic unity is "inherent in the objects" and given by nature itself.45
We cannot begin scientific research without employing this assump-
tion. Given that this assumption is operative before any particular re-
search is undertaken instead of being a posteriori derived from nature,
it must stem from reason itself and thus be transcendental.46
To the uncritical mind, the assumption of the systematicity of na-
ture looks like a constitutive principle. Kant's aim in the Transcenden-
tal Dialectic is to show that this is the result of a transcendental
«See Neiman, The Unity of Reason, 48-62. This is what Kant claims,
but it is by no means unproblematic. The precise relationship between rea-
son and the understanding is the subject of much recent debate. See Michael
Friedman "Causal Laws and the Foundations of Natural Science, in The
Cambridge Companion to Kant, 161-99; Henry Allison, Idealism and Free-
dom 80-91' Paul Guyer, "The Systematic Order of Nature and the Systematic
Union of Ends;" Martin Bondeli, "Zu Rants Behauptung der Unentbehrüch-
keit der Vernunftideen," Kant-Studien 87 (1996): 166-83.
WCPR A216/B263.
46 CPR, A650-1/B678-9, see also A653-4/B681-2.
aCPR, A651/B679.
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illusion.47 The critique reveals that although this assumption is tran-
scendental, it is not constitutive (in contrast to the categories of the
understanding), but merely regulative. It is transcendental in the
sense of being a necessary a priori principle that is always already em-
ployed by the cognizing subject. Rather than determining experience
it helps organize the experiences presented to reason by the under-
standing. Thus, the assumption that nature can be systematized by us
is not a piece of knowledge about the world, but a perspective that we
naturally take up to guide our investigations.
Kant further argues that regarding nature as a systematic unity
means regarding it as a rational order, which in turn means regarding
it as if its order were created by a higher, rational cause. In looking
for systematic unity in the universe, we "represent all connections as
if they were the arrangements of a highest reason, of which our rea-
son is a faint copy."48 This is not the same as believing that such a
highest cause exists; it is merely an idea that we implicitly or explic-
itly use when we look for order in nature.49
The similarities between this notion of systematicity in the first
critique and the concept of formal purposiveness in the third are strik-
ing.50 For in the Critique of Judgment, Kant argues that "through this
concept [of the formal purposiveness of nature] we represent nature
as if an understanding contained the ground of the unity of the mani-
fold of nature's empirical laws."51 As in the first critique, he argues
that this principle is transcendental even though it is not constitu-
tive.52
47 For a discussion of the transcendental illusion, see Michelle Grier,
"Kant on the Illusion of a Systematic Unity of Knowledge," History of Philos-
ophy Quarterly 14 (1997): 1-28.
48 CP.fi, A678/B706.
&CPR, A670/B698.60 The fact that there is continuity between the first and the third cri-
tiques in this regard is important for the purposes of this paper. I do not wish
to suggest, however, that the third critique is simply a continuation of the
first. Rudolf Makkreel has emphasized the discontinuity between the roles
of theoretical reason and reflective judgment, in that the latter, but not the
former, includes aesthetic judgment. Rudolf Makkreel, "Regulative and Re-
flective Uses of Purposiveness in Kant," Southern Journal of Philosophy 30,
Supplement (1991): 49-63 and Imagination and Interpretation: The Herme-
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Taking the use of the idea of a highest intelligence one step fur-
ther, Kant also justifies a teleological view of nature, on the grounds
that this makes possible the "greatest systematic unity" of things.63
The teleological principle states that everything in nature serves some
good purpose,64 and Kant emphasizes that this principle, like the idea
of a highest intelligence on which it is founded, is merely regulative.
In the first critique, Kant also applies this principle to all of nature. We
should "not merely consider certain parts of nature" from the teleolog-
ical point of view, but "make this systematic unity of nature com-
pletely universal, in relation to the idea of a highest intelligence."56
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant does not fully develop his
argument regarding the use and justification of teleology. He fails to
explain why teleology leads to the "greatest systematic unity" or, con-
versely, why conceiving of nature as a mechanistic system does not
suffice.56 Moreover, it would seem that the introduction of final causa-
tion into the sciences, whatever the merits of the argument might be,
would raise the question of the interrelation of final causes. It would
seem to follow from the logic of Kant's argument concerning reason's
quest for systematicity that the teieological maxim that everything in
nature serves some good purpose motivates a search for a single end
towards which all of nature is oriented. If reason strives for systema-
ticity, it cannot rest content with viewing nature as containing a mere
aggregate of teleological relations. However, Kant fails to raise this is-
sue in the first critique.
œCPR, A686-7/B714-5. On teleology in the Critique of Pure Reason,
see J. D. McFarland, Kant's Concept of Teleology (Edinburgh: University of
Edinburgh Press, 1970), 25-42, and Klaus Busing, Die Teleologie in Kants
Weltbegriff, 2nd rev. ed. (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag Herbert Grundmann, 1986),
38-50.
*CPR, A688/B716.
65 CPR, A691/B719. Kant claims that one can make many discoveries
with the help of the teleological principle. In contrast to the Critique of
Judgment, however, Kant does not yet distinguish here between external and
internal pùrposiveness. He applies the teleological principle to the shape of
the earth, to mountains and seas, as well as to organisms; CPR, A687-8/B715-
6. 56 He develops the argument in the second part of the "Appendix to the
Transcendental Dialectic," but because nothing in the first part indicates that
a systematic unity in terms of mechanical-causal laws is insufficient, the in-
troductjon. of teleology comes unexpectedly. It is no surprise that it has
eluded many commentators.
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In the Critique of Judgment, Kant does solve precisely this prob-
lem in sections 82-4.57 There he argues that if we assume (regula-
tively) that there is teleology in nature, we need to ask for an "ulti-
mate end of nature," in order to be able to regard nature as a system
of ends,58 and a "final end of creation," in order to provide a "complete
grounding" for the teleological order.59 He borrows from his practical
philosophy the claim that humans, as moral beings, are the final end
of creation, and he argues that the ultimate end of nature is to further
the development of the end-setting capacities of humans.60 This ulti-
mate end of nature Kant calls "culture," using that term—in a sense
still closely tied to its etymological origins—as synonymous with "de-
velopment" (namely, of the rational predispositions of humankind).61
Culture is the gradual development of the aptitude to set ends for one-
self, to be receptive to "higher purposes" (namely, moral ones),62 and
to use nature as a means to those ends. Kant conceives of this as a
historical process of humankind's rational and moral development.
For purposes of this essay, however, it. is important that this argu-
ment is already found in Kant's first essay on history, published a few
years after the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. In this es-
say, "Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View"
(1784), Kant raises the question of whether the seeming aggregate of
human history can be presented as a systematic whole.63 The argu-
ment in the "Idea for a Universal History" is supposed to make it pos-
67 Again, the fact that there is continuity in this particular regard should
not be taken to suggest that the differences between the two critiques are
negligible. Importantly, the very justification of teleoiogical judgment
changes from the first critique to the third. In the Critique of Pure Reason,
Kant justifies the teleological view of nature by appealing to reason's interest
in systematic unity, and he immediately applies the teleological principle to
all of nature. In the Critique of Judgment, by contrast, he first justifies the
use of teleological judgments in the case of organisms, and subsequently
broadens their scope of application.
s» CJ, 5:427, 429.
59 CJ, 5:435-6.
80 CJ, 5:431, 435. Nature cannot be oriented toward making humans
moral, of course, since morality can be the result only of a free decision by




63 "Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View,"
8:17-18, 29.
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sible for reason to avoid the conclusion that "that nature is purposive
in parts but purposeless as a whole."64 Kant argues that it is possible
to regard nature as being teleologically arranged so as to promote the
development of the human capacity to use reason. This should lead to
a point at which humankind is able to go beyond what nature can ac-
complish and transform itself into a "moral whole."65 This is a world
in which humankind has reached its destiny as a community of ratio-
nal beings, legislating and obeying moral law.
The spécifies of Kant's ideological idea of history need not con-
cern us here. In the present context, the important point is that this
idea of the course of history provides the very same teleological order-
ing principle that Kant later provides in the Critique of Judgment in
his discussion of "culture" as the "ultimate end of nature." Already in
the "Idea for a Universal History," Kant fleshes out the principle of the
teleological order that was lacking in the Critique of Pure Reason.
Thus, he dealt with the problem of the internal order of the teleologi-
cal system of nature as early as the mid 1780's.
Although we have seen that, on Kant's view, theoretical reason
borrows the idea of humanity's moral vocation from practical reason
to provide an ordering principle for a teleological conception of na-
ture as a whole, the account thus far does not yet explain how theoret-
ical and practical reason are united. For that we now need to turn to
Kant's account of practical reason.
Practical Reason. In this section, I return to the issue of the unifi-
cation of theoretical and practical reason. In Kant's work, this issue
comes up in the context of the question of the possibility of a moral
world (realm of ends). Already in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant
argues that because the a priori laws of nature and of morality are rad-
ically different and independent of each other, there is no guarantee
that moral agency will be able to have any impact on nature (where
64 "Idea for a Universal History," 8:25; see also 30.
66 "Idea for a Universal History," 8:19-21. On the idea of moral develop-
ment and its compatibility with Kant's moral philosophy, see my "Kant, His-
tory, and the Idea of Moral Development," History of Philosophy Quarterly
16 (1999): 59-80.
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nature includes our own inner nature). Kant argues that the approxi-
mation of a moral world, demanded by practical reason, is possible
only if nature is designed to harmonize with morality, and that our un-
conditional duty to promote such a world justifies our believing that
nature is so designed.66 Given that the idea of the order of nature as
the product of intelligent design is also an idea used by theoretical
reason, practical reason's idea of the world as it ought to be harmo-
nizes with theoretical reason's idea of the world as it is. Thus, the two
uses of reason are united by the notion of nature as ordered by a high-
est intelligence, that is, as purposive. This design need not be con-
ceived of as involving natural teleology, but because theoretical rea-
son already defends the teleological view of nature as promoting the
moral development of humankind, practical reason can use this teleo-
logical idea for its own purposes. Let me sketch the steps in Kant's ar-
gument.
Like theoretical reason, pure practical reason strives for system-
atic unity. The categorical imperative commands us to act only on
maxims that are compatible with other maxims of our own and with
the moral maxims of others.67 Thereby, it organizes all moral maxims
under one general principle.
Moreover, practical reason constructs an idea of the world that
would result if all individual agents always acted perfectly morally.
Kant says we arrive at the idea of a moral world when we abstract
from human weaknesses and conceive of a world in which all mem-
bers always obey the moral law.68 The members of such a world re-
gard each other as ends, and because they all act on the moral law,
their moral ends form a systematic unity. In such a world, "the free
will of each, under moral laws, is in complete systematic unity with it-
self and with the freedom of every other."69 This notion of a moral
world returns in the Foundations as the realm of ends, which Kant
calls the "systematic union of different rational beings through com-
mon objective laws."70
K, A807-19/B835-47.
67 See Paul Guyer, "The Unity of Reason," and "The Systematic Order of
Nature and the Systematic Union of Ends," and Onora O'Neill, Constructions
of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1989), 81-104.
68 CPR, A808-9/B836-7.
69 CPR, A808/B836; see A815/B843.
70 Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals 4:433.
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The moral world is an idea of a world that ought to be.71 This idea
is constructed by abstracting from the shortcomings of humans, and it
cannot be empirically instantiated. Kant claims that although the idea
cannot be fully realized, we ought to "bring the sensible world as
much as possible into conformity with the idea of the moral world"
through moral agency.72
We can do that, he suggests in the Critique of Pure Reason, only
it we view nature as a purposive system: "this systematic unity of ends
in this world of intelligences [that is, in the moral world]... also leads
inevitably to the purposive unity of all things that constitute this great
whole [namely, the world], in accordance with universal laws of na-
ture."73 Furthermore, the laws of nature and of morality are so radi-
cally different that they can be regarded as being in harmony only if
such harmony is thought to be brought about by an intelligent cre-
ator:74 "[T]he world must be represented as having originated from an
idea if it is to be in harmony with . . . the moral employment [of rea-
son]." This unites theoretical and practical reason, and "thereby, all
investigation of nature tends towards the form of a system of ends,
and in its widest extension becomes a physico-theology."76 Thus, the
conception of nature as purposive and as the result of divine design is
the linchpin that unites theoretical and practical reason.
Kant does not spell out what it means to say that the study of na-
ture "tends towards the form of a system of ends." In the first critique,
it remains unclear whether Kant thinks the harmony between nature
71 Many problems plague Kant's account of the moral world. One diffi-
culty is that Kant works with two notions of the highest good. In the pas-
sages quoted he speaks of it as a moral world of virtuous beings who produce
their own and each other's happiness. In different passages in the same
work, he defines it as happiness in proportion to virtue in an individual. Re-
gardless of which of these conceptions of the highest good he discusses, Kant
needs the assumption that nature and morality are brought into harmony by a
highest intelligence.
72 CPR, A808/B836. On this notion of the actualization of the moral
world, see Richard L. Velkley, Freedom and the End of Reason: On the Moral
Foundation of Kant's Critical Philosophy (Chicago: university of Chicago
Press, 1989), ch. 5.
73 CPR, A815/B843.
74 On Kant's doctrine of moral faith, see Allen W. Wood, Kant's Moral
Religion (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970). On Kant's precriücal con-
ception of the harmony of the laws of nature and of morality, see Velkley,
Freedom and the End of Reason, ch. 4, esp. pp. 89-95.
™CPR, A815/B843.
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and morality requires a teleological natural order, or whether a sys-
tematic unity of mechanical causal laws might do as well. In the Cri-
tique of Practical Reason, Kant states that we have a "choice" as to
how we think of the harmony between natural laws and the laws of
morality and that reason naturally opts in favor of the assumption that
a moral author of the world has established an exact harmony be-
tween the realm of nature and the realm of morality.76 Yet Kant fails
to indicate whether this harmony has to be conceived of as involving
natural teleology.
In the Critique of Judgment, however, we find an indication of
why Kant may have found it unnecessary to settle this issue in the first
two critiques. He states explicitly that there could be a harmony be-
tween the laws of nature and the laws of freedom without there being
natural teleology. He argues that the moral proof for the existence of
God is not dependent on the existence of empirical material for teleol-
ogy, and that even without natural teleology we could still postulate
that nature harmonizes with the laws of freedom:
[T]he moral proof. . . would still retain its force if we did not find in the
world any material ai all, or only ambiguous material, for physical tele-
ology. . . . And yet reason . . . would still find in the concept of freedom,
and in the moral ideas based on it, a practically sufficient basis for pos-
tulating the concept of the original being as adequate to these ideas,
that is, as a deity, and for postulating nature . . . as a final purpose that
conforms to the concept and the laws of freedom.77
The fact that a harmony between nature and morality does not require
natural teleology does not mean there is no natural teleology. Indeed,
in the same passage in which Kant says that we have grounds to be-
lieve in such harmony, even if there were nothing in nature that could
be judged teleologically, he also claims that the fact that there is "am-
ple material for physical teleology" presents a "desired confirmation"
of the harmony between nature and morality.78
Earlier in the "Critique of Teleological Judgment," of course, Kant
already argued that it is defensible to regard nature (regulatively) as a
teleological order. There, the impossibility of understanding organ-
76CPrfl, 5:145.
77 O7, 5:478-9.
78 CJ, 5:479, emphasis mine. Although it confirms the moral proof, the
possibility of regarding nature teleologically does not itself suffice to justify
the assumption of the existence of God, and hence it cannot replace the
moral proof; CJ, 5:479.
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isms without regarding them as ends is said to provide the justifica-
tion for introducing teleological concepts into the study of nature.
Once parts of nature are judged teleologically, we are also justified, at
least for heuristic purposes, to broaden the scope of the teleological
principle to all of nature.79 As we saw above, Kant looks to morality to
conceive of the teleological order as providing a fit between the ends
of nature and the moral vocation of humans. He conceives of nature
as teleologically oriented towards promoting the development (cul-
ture) of the human rational predispositions, preparing humanity for
fulfilling its moral vocation.80
This is a view that, as we also saw in the previous section, is al-
ready expressed in Kant's 1784 essay, "Idea for a Universal History."
In that essay, Kant expressly states that the teleological view of nature
and history is of both theoretical and practical importance. The ac-
count of nature as teleologically directed towards the rational and
moral development of humankind does not merely help guide theoret-
ical reason's pursuit of systematic unity of the phenomenal world, but
it also opens up a "consoling view of the future," namely, the prospect
of a human race having developed its rational predispositions and ful-
filling its moral destiny here on earth. If there were no such prospect,
despair would force the moral agent to hope for "another world." The
fact that his view of nature and history makes it possible to avoid such
moral despair, says Kant, provides a second reason for adopting the
teleological view of history.81
We are now in a position to draw some conclusions with regard
to the unification of theoretical and practical reason. First, this unifi-
cation is achieved, on Kant's view, by the fact that practical reason
leads to the assumption that nature is purposively organized by a wise
creator. This makes it possible to regard moral agency as able to influ-
ence the empirical world, and hence to regard practical reason's idea
of the world as it ought to be as harmonizing with theoretical reason's
idea of the world that is.
Second, according to Kant, practical reason does not require that
we conceive of nature, as created by God, in terms of natural teleol-
ogy. He maintains that there are independent arguments that support
*» Of, sees. 67,82-4.
80 CJ, 5:432-4.
81 "Idea for a Universal History," 8:30.
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regarding nature as a teleological system, and this makes it possible
to give a teleological account of how exactly nature harmonizes with
morality, namely, by promoting the rational, and especially moral de-
velopment (culture) of humankind.
VI
The Primacy of Practical Reason. Kant's talk of uniting theoreti-
cal and practical reason should not be taken to suggest that they have
equal standing. Kant argues that practical reason has "primacy."
There are two respects hi which practical reason reaches results that
lie beyond the power of theoretical reason. First, from the moral
point of view, the belief in the harmony between morality and nature
as well as the belief in the existence of God are justified uncondition-
ally, since these beliefs are directly connected with the consciousness
of duty, and duty is unconditional. By contrast, theoretical reason jus-
tifies merely the use of the ideas of God and the systematicity of na-
ture to guide the study of nature and its order. Because we are not un-
conditionally required to examine nature, the use of these ideas is
only conditionally justified. It is justified only "with respect to the
worldly use of our reason" (respektiv aufden Weltgebrauch unserer
Vernunft), namely, "when we study nature."82
Second, practical reason leads to much stronger assumptions
than theoretical reason. It justifies the (subjectively certain) belief
that God exists (as a practical postulate) and the associated belief
that nature is purposively ordered. Theoretical reason, by contrast,
justifies merely the use of the idea of nature as systematically ordered
by a highest intelligence (as regulative principle). Theoretical reason
cannot prove or disprove the existence of God, but according to Kant
this also means that as soon as practical reason justifies the belief in
the existence of God, theoretical reason cannot reject it. As Henry Al-
lison has aptly put this, "our practical interest (in morality and the
conditions of its possibility) is entitled to override our speculative in-
terest in avoiding ungrounded claims and the latter must therefore
submit to the former."83
œCRR, A698/B726; see "What is Orientation in Thinking?," 8:139.
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Thus, practical reason has "primacy."84 What Kant means by this
is that theoretical reason is subordinated to practical reason in the
sense that it must accept and seek to integrate certain theoretical po-
sitions justified by practical reason—such as the belief in the exist-
ence of a God who has purposively ordered nature—even though jus-
tifying these positions transcends the capacities of theoretical
reason.85
VÏÏ
"Thin" and "Thick" Unification. There is one issue that still re-
quires further discussion, namely, the fact that Kant in effect seems to
give two different accounts of the unification of theoretical and practi-
cal reason. We should distinguish—better than Kant did—between a
"thin" and a "thick" account. The thin account is more abstract than
the thick account, which provides concrete details as to how this har-
mony is to be conceived of. The thin account states that, from a moral
point of view, we need to believe that nature is the product of a wise
God who has brought nature and morality into harmony. The thin ac-
count does not further specify how this harmony should be conceived
of, and therefore does not include (or exclude) natural teleology. For
a moral agent it is strictly speaking not necessary to provide such spe-
cifics: the mere faith that morality can be effective in the world suf-
fices.
The thick account builds on the thin account. On the thick ac-
count, viewing nature as a teleological realm of ends oriented towards
human rational development provides a concrete representation of
how nature harmonizes with morality. This teleological account of na-
ture is defended by theoretical reason, which uses the notion of the
moral vocation of humanity as a systematizing principle. The thick,
teleological account is not strictly necessary to conceive of the
83 Henry E. Allison, Idealism and Freedom: Essays on Kant's Theoreti-
cal and Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996), 19.
MCPrR, 5:121.
36 On the primacy of practical reason, see also Roger J. Sullivan, Imman-
uel Kant's Moral Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 95-
113 and Frederick Rauscher, "Kant's Two Priorities of Practical Reason,"
British Journal of the History of Philosophy 6 (1998): 397-419.
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conditions for the possibility of the moral world, and its justifiability
depends on whether the empirical world gives us occasion to regard
nature as a teleological order. Because Kant argues there are good
reasons for viewing nature as a teleological order, he regards
thick account as justified.
As a result, Kant is drawn to comparisons between the role
leology for theoretical and for moral purposes. For example, in a
footnote in the Foundations, he describes the relationship between
the notion of a realm of ends in natural teleology and in moral theory
as follows:
Teleology considers nature as a realm of ends; morals regards a possi-
ble reS^ of ends as a realm of nature. In the former the realm of ends
fea theoretical idea for the explanation of what exists. In the latter it is
a prS idea for bringing about that which does «**£**£*
can become actual through our conduct, in accordance with this i
When the teleological natural order is conceived as oriented towards
human moral development, it provides a representation of how the
practical idea can be approximated, by representing nature as condu-
cive to rational development in general and moral development m par-
ticular At the same time, representing nature as teleologically on-
ented towards the rational and moral development of humans
provides an organizational principle for regarding nature as a whole
as a teleological system.
In sum, the two uses of reason are not only not in conflict, DU
they both lead to the (thin) view of nature as divinely designed.87 The-
oretical and practical reason are united or combined through the be-
lief that nature harmonizes with morality. Their unification does not
depend on whether there is any ground for judging nature from a tele-
ological point of view. Kant's conviction that teleological judgments
are justified (if only regulatively) enables him to defend, in addition, a
thick version of their unification.
» Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4:436, note; see "On the
TTw of Teleoloeical Principles in Philosophy," 8:182-3.
« Of course it should be kept in mind that the epistemic status of tius
view is that of a regulative idea in one case, and of a practical postulate in th
other.
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The Unity of Reason and the Critique of Judgment. Part of what
the preceding discussions show is that, contrary to what many com-
mentators assert, the famous passage in the introduction to the Cri-
tique of Judgment,96 about the "immense gulf between nature and
freedom, does not state a new problem. Rather, it is a restatement of
the problem of the unification of theoretical and practical reason in
the Critique of Pure Reason. In the third critique, Kant states that
while no transition from nature to the realm of freedom is possible, it
is practically necessary to conceive of freedom as having an influence
in the world of sense, because such influence is morally demanded.
Kant concludes: "it must be possible to think of nature as being such
that the lawfulness in its form will harmonize with at least the possi-
bility of the purposes that we are to achieve in nature according to
laws of freedom."89 In the rest of the introduction, he argues that the
transcendental concept of the purposiveness of nature provides the
connection between nature and freedom: "[T]hrough this concept we
cognize the possibility of the final purpose [set by the concept of free-
dom], which can become actual only in nature and in accordance with
its laws."90 This transcendental concept of the purposiveness of na-
ture, however, is nothing else than the concept of nature as a product
of the final causality of an intelligent designer. This concept appears
already in the first critique.
Despite this and the many other continuities between Kant's ac-
count of the 1780's and that of the Critique of Judgment discussed
above, there are also some very significant differences. Commenta-
tors who claim that Kant here argues for the unity of reason (either for
the first time or as an elaboration of his earlier views)61 overlook the
fact that the third critique does not seem to offer an account of the
unity of theoretical and practical reason at all. As Paul Guyer has
rightly observed, in reassigning the concept of purposiveness to the
faculty of judgment, Kant strips theoretical reason of an important
function. This reassignment, however, does not represent Kant's last




91 See notes 6 and 9 above.
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reason—as Guyer suggests—but rather a radical alteration of this
doctrine. After having developed the doctrine of the unity of theoreti-
cal and practical reason in the 1780's, Kant now seems suddenly to re-
duce reason to practical reason,92 erasing theoretical reason from his
charts of mental powers.93 The notion that there is one and the same
faculty of reason that is used theoretically and practically virtually
disappears, and instead Kant now focuses on the relationship be-
tween the understanding, (practical) reason, and judgment.94 Instead
of unifying theoretical and practical reason, the concept of the
purposiveness of nature now "connects the legislations of the under-
standing and reason."95
Despite the many continuities, then, the Critique of Judgment
seems also to depart from Kant's previous account of the unity of rea-
son.96 It lies beyond the scope of this essay, however, to work out the
details of the later view. I have mentioned it here to underscore the
fact that if the proposed account of Kant's 1780's doctrine of the unity
of reason is convincing, it necessitates a réévaluation of the relation-
ship between this doctrine and the third critique.
Conclusion. Kant's three claims about the unity of reason are
consistent. The claim that theoretical and practical reason are one
and the same faculty, merely applied differently, should be seen as a
regulative principle based on reason's own interest in systematicity,
and not as a claim to knowledge. This makes it consistent with the
claim that we do not yet have insight into reason's unity. Further-
more, the claim that theoretical and practical reason are united
should be read as referring to the compatibility of and connection be-
92 Kant does not discuss what, if anything, is left of theoretical reason
and its three ideas. He occasionally seems to presuppose its continued exist-
ence (for example, at CJ, 5:342, and 401), but he does not provide a revised
account of its function.
93 CJ, 5:198; see also 20:245-46.
"CJ, 5:195-8.
96 Kant's reorganization of the cognitive faculties may have been moti-
vated more by his discovery of an a priori principle that could ground his aes-
thetic theory and less by a dissatisfaction with his own previous theory of
the unity of reason. In that case, the newly prominent faculty of judgment in-
troduces a problem for Kant by unsettling his previous doctrine of the unity
of reason I shall not investigate these deeper motives here, however, as the
main argument of this paper does not depend on the motives for the change
in Kant's view.
KANT ON THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL REASON 339
tween the two uses of this one faculty. This reading not only resolves
the apparent tension between Kant's three claims, but it also brings
into view Kant's account of the unity of reason before the Critique of
Judgment.9''
Washington University
971 would like to thank Joel Anderson, Thad Metz, Fred Rauscher, Fred
Rush, and Allen Wood for helpful comments on an earlier version of this pa-
per.
